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Abstract 
Struggles relating to governance of water resources by indigenous peoples are a well 
documented issue in social science literature world-wide. Informed by the debates in this 
literature, our research examines recent initiatives to enhance Māori role in water 
governance in Aotearoa/New Zealand based on a case of the recently reinvented 
governance arrangements for Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere in the Canterbury region.  In the 
New Zealand context, governance of freshwater has undergone significant restructuring in 
the last twenty-five years, with wide-ranging changes being precipitated by the neo-liberal 
agendas of recent governments. Emerging alongside this neo-liberal agenda was the revival 
of indigenous rights language in New Zealand, a reflection of recently growing recognition 
within the wider New Zealand society of the aboriginal customary natural resource 
ownership and management rights guaranteed to Māori by the Treaty of Waitangi signed in 
1840. We argue that three factors: property rights, globalisation and the regulatory planning 
environment for management both enable and constrain indigenous peoples to govern 
natural resources within a post-colonial society such as New Zealand, using Te Waihora as a 
case.  
1. Introduction 
Struggles’ relating to effective participation by indigenous peoples in natural resource 
governance in post-colonial societies is an important question in the social science literature 
(Howitt et.al., 1996; Wilson and Memon, 2010). A key theme in current literature is the 
significance of collaborative institutional arrangements for natural resource governance as a 
means of giving agency to indigenous peoples. Arguably, as a means of power sharing, 
collaborative governance institutions can enable engagement by hitherto disenfranchised 
indigenous groups in natural resource management, participating with other stakeholder 
groups and the state (Berkes, 1986; Smith and Wishnie, 2000; Rangan and Lane, 2001). 
Such potentially innovative hybrid governance institutions are becoming increasingly 
evident in post-colonial societies as a means to settle long-standing land grievances (Hunn 
et al., 2003; Petchey, 2007; Breton et al., 2007). However, critics of collaborative 
governance from an indigenous perspective argue that such seemingly ‘inclusive’ natural 
resource governance arrangements have been far from successful as a means to both 
empower local indigenous communities and to promote sustainable environmental 
management practices (Peluso 2008; 2009). Far from identifying ‘inclusive’ governance 
structures, these studies highlight continuing struggles over highly contested issues such as 
property rights and differing culturally-informed understanding of ‘sustainable 
management’ and how it should be achieved in practice (Wilson and Memon, 2010). Do the 
voices of the ‘subaltern’ continue to be buried amongst predominant Western institutions 
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which as Ellis (2005) argues, take away the power of indigenous peoples to move towards 
more substantial sustainability?   
In the New Zealand geo-political context, governance of freshwater has undergone 
significant restructuring in the last twenty-five years, with wide-ranging changes towards 
devolved environmental governance being precipitated by the neo-liberal agendas of recent 
governments keen to encourage expansion of agricultural exports in the global economy. 
Emerging alongside this neo-liberal agenda was the revival of indigenous rights language in 
New Zealand during the 1970s, a reflection of an emergent political recognition within the 
wider New Zealand society of the ownership and governance rights over natural resources 
guaranteed to Māori by the Treaty of Waitangi signed in 1840 with the British Crown, 
coupled with realisation of injustices caused by dispossession of natural resources and 
impoverishment of Māori precipitated by European colonisation and settlement. Both major 
political parties have thus agreed to restitution measures in recent times which have 
included opening up unique spaces for indigenous participation in natural resource 
governance. Restitution measures include collaborative natural resource governance 
initiatives with Māori communities at iwi (tribal) and hapū (sub-trial) levels as part of the 
Treaty settlement process.  
Set within the above context, in this study we set out to critically examine the continuing 
contest over governance of a lake of culturally historic importance and a source of mahinga 
kai (food sustenance) to Māori in the Canterbury region of the South Island of New Zealand. 
This lake was the subject of recent Treaty claims by the Ngāi Tahu tribe in the South Island. 
As discussed in this paper, the Treaty settlement between the Crown and the Ngāi Tahu 
people has partially restored tribal property rights in the lake and required the development 
of a joint management plan with the central government conservation agency (Department 
of Conservation, hereafter DoC) which also has a statutory function to manage the lake. 
While these measures have empowered the iwi and hapū as stakeholders in the 
management of the lake and its catchment, as well as enabling them to exercise a wider role 
in freshwater governance in Canterbury, informed by our empirical research findings, we 
argue that Māori agency in lake governance is fundamentally constrained by three inter-
related factors: property rights, globalisation and the regulatory environment.  
Data for this study was obtained from multiple sources including published and unpublished 
archival source and 16 in-depth interviews with key Ngāi Tahu informants from the tribal 
authority (te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu, hereafter TRONT) and the local rūnanga’s (sub-tribal or 
hapū authorities), central government officials, local and regional government officials, 
elected members of council as well as non-governmental environmental advocacy groups. 
The confidential in-depth interviews took place during June and July 2010 and lasted 
between one and two hours each. The recorded interviews were subsequently transcribed 
for content analysis. The interviews sought to elicit from respondents their perspectives and 
understandings of the role Māori currently  exercised in freshwater governance of Te 
Waihora and its catchment within the broader historical and current socio-political settings 
of the Canterbury region.  
The paper is organised as follows. Based on a literature review, section 2 sets the 
conceptual framework for this study by exploring factors shaping the environmental 
governance of freshwater in post-colonial societies with a specific emphasis on the 
 3 
 
significance of property rights, globalisation and the regulatory planning environment. This 
literature review informs the empirical analysis in the rest of the paper.  Thus, section 3 
examines the historical antecedents to the contested Māori role in water governance in 
New Zealand while section 4 will examine the contested governance history of Te Waihora 
from a similar perspective. Section 5 then extrapolates the significance of factors presented 
in the literature review in section 2 in order to assay the extent to which Māori are able to 
exercise agency in the current governance landscape for Te Waihora. Section 6 will review 
the wider significance of our findings with section 7 concluding.  
2. Conceptual context 
Indigenous peoples in post-colonial societies (Said, 1978) face a challenge in ensuring their 
customary ownership rights, practices and indigenous knowledge systems are reflected in 
institutional arrangements for natural resource management (Isin and Wood, 1999; 
Coombes, 2003). Given this context, recent policy initiatives in post-colonial societies to 
respond to indigenous demands for ownership and management rights of their ancestral 
domains are an important issue for examination (Bridge and Perreault, 2009). The signing of 
the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 enabled European settlement in New Zealand but it also 
promised Māori unqualified exercise of their rangatiratanga (chieftainship or governance) 
in regards to valuable natural resources, including water. Thus, it has been argued by 
Matunga (2000) that the Treaty anticipated two parallel planning mandates for natural 
resource governance: a Māori planning mandate and a Pakeha (European) planning 
mandate. The failure of the successive colonial Governments to honour these Treaty rights 
has meant that “Māori planning, with its associated traditions, approaches and 
practises…has for the last 140 years occupied a space outside [the Pakeha] framework, 
through a process of deliberate colonial exclusion.” History has shaped Māori as a 
‘subaltern’, a group who exists outside of the hegemonic power structure (Coombes, 2007). 
Hence, a question that has motivated our study is to what extent do collaborative natural 
resource governance arrangements negotiated with Māori tribes in recent Treaty 
settlements address this concern? 
A focal point in post-colonial studies is the effects of colonisation on cultures in a modern 
setting, describing the perpetuation of colonial practices in contemporary societies often 
relating to land alienation and the relationship between Western and non-Western ideals 
(Radcliffe, 2005). Some post-colonial writers argue that despite efforts by recent 
governments to address injustices resulting from the historic processes of colonisation, the 
underlying logic of colonialism is still alive. In natural resource governance, these logics can 
be manifested in the continuing marginalisation of indigenous systems of governance by 
global economic interests, Western nature conservation values and formal resource 
management planning and decision making processes primarily reliant on scientific, rather 
than local knowledge.  
Hybrid natural resource governance institutions have been mooted to provide a sense of 
participation and agency to indigenous people. Post-colonial theorists retort by arguing that 
these plans attempt integration of indigenous knowledge but end up forcing the subaltern 
to speak through foreign systems and lexicon in order to gain recognition for their own 
management styles. What occurs is either a dilution of indigenous models, or that 
mainstream policy makers will choose to fall back on institutions and ideas that they are 
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most familiar with (Stevenson, 2006). It is argued further (d’Hauteserre, 2005; McKinley, 
2005) that in the New Zealand context, Māori systems have been regarded by policy makers 
as honourable but without applicability to scientific rationale – therefore alienating Māori 
from any real engagement with science and management. 
How then do indigenous people gain legitimate power if they co-exist in an environment 
which views their values, ideals and models as those of the subaltern? Is Spivak (1988) 
correct in his assertion that the subaltern ‘cannot speak’ and that by attempting to speak or 
translate on their behalf naturally belittles the content of their ideas? Removing the political 
and cultural content of indigenous knowledges in order to apply them to co-management or 
hybrid governance schemes, in the view of some authors (Ellis, 2005), takes away the power 
that could liberate Western systems from mere window dressing towards substantial 
sustainability.  
Post-colonial literature offers a robust critique of indigenous people’s role in natural 
resource governance in societies such as New Zealand and underpins the theoretical 
significance of our study to develop an understanding of to what extent indigenous people 
exercise an active role in freshwater governance in Canterbury.  We address this question in 
the Waihora case in terms of three factors: property rights, globalisation and the regulatory 
environment for management.  
Indigenous property rights and the associated issues of historical land sales and allocations 
are key to understanding the environmental governance of freshwater resources (Ostrom 
and Nagendra, 2006). The way in which property rights are defined and re-defined will play 
a great role in the amount of agency accorded to indigenous peoples to govern water 
resources. The notion of indigenous freshwater management only becomes meaningful if 
there are specific areas or territories which have been set aside for indigenous ownership, 
title or management. This could include the return of important waterways which had 
previously been ceded, the demarcation of indigenous water reserves or a co-management 
role in a locally important waterway (Ostrom and Nagendra, 2006). 
Arguably, globalisation has been a powerful driver in shaping modern post-colonial 
economies and reconfiguring political economy relationships between the colonisers and 
the colonised. Its economic influence has become more pervasive during the late 20th 
century in terms of subjecting local economies to the influence of global markets, 
consumers and capital. As Swaffield and Brower (2010, p.161) explain:  
Its characteristics include the global integration of industrial and agricultural 
production and marketing … (Goodman and Watts, 1997; Held et al, 1999), the 
deregulation of financial markets and increasing mobility of capital (Harvey, 2000), 
and increasing interconnection of local and regional communities within a global 
network society (Castells, 2000).  
In addition to property rights and the processes of globalisation, recent authors have 
identified the regulatory environment for management as an important dynamic which has 
shaped the evolution of indigenous natural resource management institutions (Coombes 
and Hill, 2005; Silver et al., 2007; Pinkerton et al., 2008). In the indigenous management 
context we can draw two regulatory distinctions: first, are exogenous regulations relating to 
state planning policies and secondly, are endogenous regulations, which recount the specific 
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practises and self-regulations of the indigenous communities (Ostrom and Nagendra, 2006). 
Indigenous territories are nearly always embedded within a larger nation-state with the 
consequence being that exogenous regulations are always going to have a role to play in the 
management of indigenous territories, with legislature controlling water use and local 
government resource management plans limiting or enhancing the possibilities for action. 
Endogenous regulations on the other hand are unique to the community, for example, how 
they implement their own ‘moral codes’ in management decisions; the structure of 
governance institutions and the enforcement of specific bans to allow resources to 
regenerate (Roberts et al., 1995).   
In section 5 we  examine how the above three factors interact with Māori agency in 
governance  of Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere in the South Island of New Zealand  in the wider 
historical and current geo-political setting of Canterbury and wake of the recent Treaty 
settlement with the Ngāi Tahu tribe. We will ask to what extent redefinitions of property 
rights, globalisation and the regulatory environment enable Māori inhabitants to exercise 
tino rangatiratanga (chieftainship) over the resource.  
3. Māori concerns on water ownership and its governance: A historical perspective 
As a context to the Canterbury case study, this section will focus on the historical 
antecedents to the current understanding amongst Māori that water ownership rights 
guaranteed under the Treaty of Waitangi and a water governance role in partnership with 
the Crown should be discussed in contemporary political discoursei.  Māori argue that they 
never ceded ownership or governance rights over water during the process of large scale 
19th century land sales to Europeans and that these customary rights are still intactii .  
 
3.1. Pre-colonial Māori water ownership and endogenous regulation institutions 
In the pre-colonial Māori society, freshwater was regarded as a valuable resource 
collectively owned and allocated by communities. Perception of water was bound in cultural 
and spiritual beliefs and the physical and spiritual realms were interlinked. Access to water 
and other natural resources was governed under customary law. In these relatively tight knit 
communal societies, the practices and uses of water were embedded within a holistic 
setting, with water being considered a taonga (treasure). Under tikanga Māori (customs), 
water which existed within the sea, river, creek, lake or spring was not viewed as being 
separate entities. Its life giving force and importance in sustaining aquatic life, which was 
vital to Māori as a food source, was recognised. Thus, it was common for restrictions to be 
placed on the uses of certain waters, or the taking of fish and shellfish from water at certain 
times of the year to ensure that food stocks were sustained.  A stretch of water or a body of 
water considered tapu (sacred) may be guarded by protective spirits known as taniwha. In 
these cases there were rituals symbolising both the spiritual and physical values of water 
(Ward and Scarf, 1993; Memon, 1997a) 
As discussed below, not withstanding Treaty obligations, the early colonial settler 
government transplanted the riparian water ownership regime in New Zealand which led to 
erosion of Māori rights. This private property regime has been subsequently replaced by 
state monopoly over water allocation and pollution rights since 1967. The wider significance 
of the above changes in property rights in water discussed in the rest of section 3 has to be 
understood in the broader political economy context of the role of the state as the largest 
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land owner and developer in New Zealand until the advent of wide ranging neo-liberal state 
sector reforms during the 1980s .  
For nearly a century and a half, the state played a pivotal role to successfully foster the 
development of a grasslands economy to enable New Zealand carve out a comfortable niche 
within the global capitalist economy (Hawke, 1985).  Māori values, economic systems and 
forms of government, including traditional institutions for resource management, were 
overlooked or deliberately ignored in the growing apparatus of state sponsored 
development initiatives (Memon, 1993). In Māori eyes, the state was the biggest offender in 
terms of adverse environmental impacts, with its wide ranging economic development and 
infrastructure provision activities affecting the quality and supply of freshwater. Until the 
1970s, the state exempted itself from statutory environmental and planning regulations.  
Despite wide ranging state involvement in the New Zealand economy and society, central 
and local government politicians were extremely solicitous of private property owners. Rural 
land owners jealously guarded their assumed rights to make land use decisions and demand 
access to water unencumbered by what they perceived as excessive regulations.  
The cumulative consequences of decisions and actions which displaced the endogenous 
Māori economy by successfully transplanting an exogenous  export based economy , and 
the attitudes and understandings they have engendered amongst the present day 
descendents of European settlers, underpin the long standing impasse, still not fully 
resolved, over the highly contested issues of Māori water ownership and governance rights. 
Only relatively recently have efforts been made to address Māori water grievances by the 
Government within the tribal Treaty settlements.  
3.2. Riparian water rights regime 
The early European migrants bought with them their own cultural perspectives and 
associated property rights institutions relating to water. Water was primarily valued as a key 
input in the new land based economy producing bulk agricultural commodities for distant 
northern hemisphere markets. The settlers transplanted from Europe the common law 
riparian water rights system based on land ownership. Under common law, there was no 
ownership in water but land owners had the right to take and use surface water in any 
quantities provided this not impact on downstream users. Land owners also had a right to 
abstract groundwater, but in this instance there was no restriction on negatively impacting 
on other users of the resource (Ward and Scarf, 1993; Memon and Skelton, 2007).  
Even though the riparian regime was abolished in 1967, arguably the attitudes and practices 
it engendered still prevail today as forces of formal and informal institutional inertia. The 
riparian scheme engendered the belief among farmers and local authority decision-makers 
that there was no need to use water frugally (Memon and Skelton, 2007).  A still commonly 
held attitude amongst rural land owners and some central and local government decision 
makers today is that rural land owners are entitled to use water for economic gain as part of 




3.3. Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 
The Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 (WSCA) laid the foundations for the current 
devolved water planning regime. The Act abolished riparian rights in water and instead 
vested the right to allocate and use water in the Crown, thus ignoring the rights of Māori. 
The Act was based on the multiple-use philosophy which accommodated the values of the 
predominantly Pakeha famers and recreational and environmental groupsiii but effectively 
ignored Māori values. 
The WSCA created a two-tier system for water planning and established the “prior 
appropriation” (first in line, first in right) practice for water allocation by regional water 
boards. However, until the late 1980s, devolution of water allocation functions to farmer 
dominated regional water boards was mediated by the National Water and Soil 
Conservation Authority (NWASCA), a powerful central Government quango which had a 
quasi-judicial role to resolve conflicts over water allocation (Memon, 1993; Roche, 1994).  
In hindsight, irrespective of the two de jure water rights regimes which were arguably 
superimposed on Māori customary values, initially as private property and subsequently as 
state property, de facto water has commonly been perceived as an abundant resource and 
for this reason has tended to managed akin to open access property. Māori were also 
excluded in the role of decision-makers in the new two tier water bureaucracy that was 
established to address growing conflicts over water allocation. 
3.4. Resource Management Act 1991 
The current statutory water planning framework is based on the Resource Management Act 
1991 (RMA). It is a devolved water planning mandate. The RMA places responsibility for 
water resource planning in the hands of elected regional councils based on the subsidiarity 
principle. The economistic logic of subsidiarity has meant that central government has failed 
to exercise leadership.  At the same time, local government has struggled to undertake its 
water planning functions on account of lack of resources, capacity and capability (Memon, 
1997b; McNeill, 2008).  
From the particular perspective of Māori, the RMA juridical water planning framework has a 
number of weaknesses. Firstly, during the process of enacting the RMA legislation, it was 
anticipated that the Act would define Māori property rights in water but this did not 
transpire for political reasons (Memon, 1993). Secondly, Māori are grossly under-
represented in local government as elected decision makers. Rural land interests, commonly 
hostile to Māori aspirations, continue to exercise strong dominance in local government in 
provincial regions. Māori have been forced to rely primarily on advocacy in order to 
promote their particular values and concerns about water allocation and quality. This 
constrains their ability to exercise rangatiratanga.  
Third, regional and district councils have been politically reluctant to regulate water 
allocation and land use intensification (Memon, 1997b; Memon and Selsky, 2004). Water 
scarcity and declining water quality are ranked as prime public environmental concerns as 
well as those of Māori communities. Fourth, the RMA juridical framework, embedded in an 
Anglophonic culture of adversarial conflict resolution, has struggled to cope with the 
cultural complexities of water conflicts.  
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A final concern of Māori is that local authorities have struggled to give adequate 
consideration to the provisions of the Act which pertain to taking into account Māori values 
and interestsiv. Some critics question the degree to which Māori and non-Māori values can 
be integrated within a single statute (Matunga, 2000). For example, Section 33 of the RMA 
permits local authorities to transfer their power, functions or duties to a local authority 
which may not be part of the local council. This includes iwi authorities which as long as they 
meet the four criteria for transfer (mutual agreement, appropriateness for the community, 
efficiency and technical capability), are eligible to be devolved a great deal of power 
(Thomson, Rennie and Tutua-Nathan, 2000). To date, no devolution of power under section 
33 of the RMA has been granted to iwi authorities.v  
4. Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere Case Study 
The Te Waihora case study exemplifies long standing Māori concerns highlighted in the 
previous section focussed on dispossession of water resources and the struggle to secure 
ownership and governance rights. It also provides insights into the socio-political dynamics 
which have shaped recent efforts by Māori to secure and exercise these rights in the context 
of the recent Treaty settlement negotiations. 
Te Waihora is a large body of water located in the South Island region of Canterbury, just 
south of the largest city in the island, Christchurch (Figure 1). The lake is low lying, with a 
shallow depth and is naturally eutrophic. Its closeness to the Pacific Ocean coastline also 
means that it harbours birdlife and fish life much like an estuary would (Singleton (2007)vi. 
Most of the lake catchment is drained by the Selwyn River and small ground water fed 
streams. 
Te Waihora was managed by the local Māori communally prior to colonisation, providing a 
rich source of food. Taumutu is said to be the first permanent settlement on Waihora. 
Historians believe it was established by Te Rakitamau (or Te Rangitamau) of the Ngāi Tahu 
approximately 300 years ago, although it is doubtful that he was the first to camp in the 
area (Singleton, 2007). During the 1840s, Māori reportedly opened and closed the outlet of 
the lake into the sea for the purpose of draining the Taumutu Township as well as helping 
mahinga kai to flourish as much as possible.  
During this period, Ngāi Tahu sold large amounts of their land in the South Island to the 
Crown, a deal which has subsequently become known as the Kemp Purchase. In regards to 
Waihora, the Kemp Purchase boundaries have been the subject of a historical Treaty claim 
lodged with the Waitangi Tribunal by the Ngāi Tahuvii. During Waitangi Tribunal hearings, 
the argument raised by the claimants was that the Crown enforced interpretations of the 
eastern boundaries of the Kemp purchase that were not agreed to by local Ngāi Tahu 
(Waitangi Tribunal, 1991: 459). In the words of the Tribunal: 
Ngāi Tahu wanted the eastern boundary to follow the line-of-sight from Otomatua to 
Taumutu and thus to exclude from the sale Kaitorete, most of Waihora and its north-
eastern shoreline with the adjoining wetlands. 
Following the Kemp Purchase, the eastern-boundary Ngāi Tahu had agreed too was slowly 
eroded. During a visit by Crown representative Walter Mantell shortly after the Kemp 
purchase, Ngāi Tahu once again raised their concerns about this eastern boundary. They 
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claim that repeated requests for this eastern boundary to exclude Waihora were ignored, 
and that:  
It is clear that Ngāi Tahu did not intend to part with this treasured fishery. We are 
satisfied they fully intended to retain unimpeded access to both Waihora and the 
spit. This they made abundantly clear to Mantell. He deliberately chose to disregard 
their rights. In doing so he failed to comply with the terms of purchase which 
preserved Ngāi Tahu their mahinga kai, and acted in breach of the Treaty (Waitangi 
Tribunal, 1991: 466). 
In the eyes of Ngāi Tahu claimants, it was inconceivable that they would sell such a valuable 
and necessary asset.  
In regards to the day to day management of the lake, the Taumutu people still continued to 
manage the outlet during the early years of European settlement. According to Singleton 
(2007) the records show that Māori opened the outlet in 1852, 1854, 1856, 1865 and finally 
in 1867, by which time there was conflict over how much and at what times the lake should 
be opened. In 1868 the Pakeha farmer Charles Chapman opened the lake himself and from 
then on it became the accepted responsibility of the new European settlers around the lake 
to manage its margins. The priorities of the settler farming community were different from 
the traditional Māori inhabitants however, with the latter favouring higher water levels to 
maintain mahinga kai and Pakeha desiring the lake to be as low as possible to maximise the 
arable land for farming around the lakeside (Singleton, 2007). 
Subsequently, Māori challenged these decisions by appealing to central Government. In 
1865 the people of Taumutu, through their representative Natanahiri Waruwarutu, 
protested to the Natives Minister about the drainage of Waihora (Waitangi Tribunal, 1991). 
This continued throughout the next decade, with an 1878 protest arguing that drainage was 
damaging the eel population. A petition was also presented in 1881 and like the other 
appeals, fell on deaf earsviii.  
Since then, farming intensity has rapidly increased in the Waihora catchment, aided by the 
advent of mechanised irrigation from the rivers and groundwater (Memon and Selsky, 
2004). The lake has been treated as a sink for waste, with the major causes of degradation 
being farm run off, sewage and the manipulation of the lake outlets to foster more arable 
farmland (Jull, 1989; James, 1991; TRONT, 1999).  This was the situation which faced Māori 
up until a period of restitution for the ills of colonisation which began in the 1980s. The 
current institutional arrangements for the lake are partly an outcome of these negotiations.  
During the Treaty negotiation process, Ngāi Tahu were assertive in their twin desires to 
reclaim ownership and governance of Te Waihora in order to restore the lake as a source of 
mahinga kai for the local tangata whenua and made this a key plank in their negotiation 
strategy (Waitangi Tribunal, 1991). One can debate to what extent the lake ownership and 
governance outcomes sought by Ngāi Tahu negotiators have been achieved. Even though 
the Tribunal found in favour of Ngāi Tahu on both issues (Waitangi Tribunal, 1991), the 
ensuing Treaty settlement negotiations significantly whittled down the Tribunal 
recommendations. The Crown refused for political reasons to consider transfer of 
ownership of the water in the lake to Ngāi Tahu.  The Ngāi Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998 
gives the tribe only partial ownership over the lake, limited to the lake bed and some 
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surrounding lakeshore properties. The lake bed and the lakeshore land were formerly 
managed by DoC on behalf of the Crown. DoC continues to retain management control over 
the remaining lakeshore Crown properties as part of the national conservation estate.  
In accordance with Ngāi Tahu aspirations for lake governance, the Tribunal 
recommendations had envisaged a four party collaborative agreement between Ngāi Tahu, 
DoC and the two local authorities (Canterbury Regional Council and the Sewlyn District 
Council). The Treaty of Waitangi Policy Unit in the Department of Justice also investigated 
the options for a partnership between Ngai Tahu and central and local government 
representatives to manage land and water use activities in the wider catchment 
(Department of Justice, 1994).  Such an institutional arrangement would enable Māori to 
exercise a formal governance role over the lake and its catchment within the framework of 
the RMA. This again proved politically unacceptably, presumably in part due to opposition 
from local authorities and rural land owners.   
Instead, the Settlement Act made provision for the preparation of a joint-management plan 
between DoC and Ngāi Tahu to enable coordination of activities between the two spatially 
contiguous land owners and to ensure that DoC took into consideration mahinga kai values. 
This is essentially a land management plan, not an integrated plan for the lake and its 
catchment. Institutionally, the governance of the lake is now fragmented between the local 
territorial authority (Selwyn District Council), the regional council (Canterbury Regional 
Council), the Crown conservation department (DoC) and Ngāi Tahu. There is no integrated 
catchment plan for the lake as yet.  Within the RMA statutory framework, the Regional 
Council and the District council exercise water and land use regulation functions 
respectively, while DoC regulates the Crown land in accordance with the Conservation Act. 
All three authorities are expected to recognise the provisions of the joint management plan.  
4.1. The Te Waihora Joint Management Plan 
The Te Waihora Joint Management Plan (JMP) (DoC and Te Runanga o Ngāi Tahu, 2005) is 
the first statutory joint land management plan between the Crown and a tribal authority in 
New Zealand.  
In accordance with a court ruling that enunciated partnership between the Crown and 
Māori as a Treaty principleix, the Conservation Act was amended in 1987 (s(4)) to stipulate 
that: 
This Act shall be interpreted and administered as to give effect to the principles of 
the Treaty of Watiangi. 
The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment (1988: 28) also encouraged 
government departments to consider co-management arrangements: 
…the implementation of the Treaty principles of partnership and tribal 
rangatiratanga (iwi authority to make decision and control resources) requires a 
change in the existing power equation between the Treaty partners, giving tangata 




This encouraged DoC to investigate with tangata whenua (local people) opportunities for 
shared decision making arrangements for parts of the Crown conservation estate:  
…in line with the principles of the Treaty the Department of Conservation is seeking 
to achieve joint decision-making on any allocation of the resource, with the partners 
assuming shared and singular responsibilities in the process (Owen 1992: 14). 
A year earlier, in response to the Waitangi Tribunal recommendation that collaborative 
management of Te Waihora would be a positive settlement initiative, James (1991: 25), 
from the Department of Conservation proposed that: 
Te Waihora presents an ideal opportunity for the Department of Conservation to 
develop a partnership with Ngāi Tahu…The iwi is keen to take management 
responsibility and the Department acknowledges both its obligations to recognize the 
rangatiratanga of the tangata whenua, and the conservation concerns it has in 
common with them. 
However, it was not until 1996 that the Crown and Ngāi Tahu finally reached an agreement 
for joint management of Te Waihora because other users of the lake (farmers, fishers, 
hunters and recreationists) colluded to block the arrangement (Prystupa, 1998). These 
groups were significant in size and often closely tied to DoC, making negotiations difficult. 
These difficulties along with the political sensitivity surrounding Treaty restitutions meant it 
took until 2005 to finally complete the JMP.  
4.2 The JMP development process 
The JMP articulates jointly negotiated objectives and policies for co-ordinated management 
of the land (including lake bed) owned by the two spatially contiguous landlords. Within the 
plan area (Figure 2), the DoC still continues to administer around 35% of the total area of Te 
Waihora, along with McQueen’s Lagoon, another important ecological site in the Te 
Waihora environment.  Ngāi Tahu under the plan own and manage the “bed of Te Waihora” 
as well as Te Waimakou on the Kaitorete Spit, an area which is referred to in the plan as the 
Ngāi Tahu ‘lakebed’. The title to this land was granted to Ngāi Tahu under the Treaty 
settlement. 
The plan development process was a cultural learning process for both parties. When 
describing the development of the JMP, a planner observed that: 
The scope ... of the process was pretty much set out in the [Ngāi Tahu] Settlement 
Act. So the process was pretty much an extended policy planning process within a 
statutory framework. [But] we managed it on a values rather than [the conventional] 
issues based [management planning] approach [practised by DoC] [Respondent 10].  
The Te Waihora Management Board, representing the six Ngāi Tahu rūnanga who were 
considered to have a close traditional relationship with the lake, were active in the planning 
process by instilling local values into the plan. According to a DoC respondent: 
[The Board] had an informal function during the [earlier Treaty] claim process, 
[representing] about 6 rūnanga with an interest in the lake. When we were doing the 
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plan, [the Board was brought] together again in a semi-formal way [by the tribe] to 
represent the rūnanga [Respondent 6]. 
The values based planning approach helped merge the desires of the two parties together, 
even if some of the processes were novel for DoC. As one respondent recalled: 
Department of Conservation tended to want to focus on species and the traditional 
scientific analysis for planning and Māori wanted to emphasis the cultural interests 
and values, the traditional stories, and knowledge which had gone before. One of the 
ways they [DoC] resolved it was to take a holistic approach. So one of the key 
projects we did was an oral history where we got a PhD student listening to and 
gathering information from people in the area, not just Ngāi Tahu but from 
recreationalists, farmers, fishers and the like. This gave a more personal perspective 
[Respondent 10]. 
Notwithstanding this, there were feelings of antagonism from the Waihora Management 
Board. A DoC official reminisced that the board had: 
…a feeling they hadn’t got what they deserved, they wanted all the conservation 
lands. Some of them also wanted that wider agreement [with Selwyn District Council 
and the Canterbury Regional Council], including the RMA things. They felt they hadn’t 
got everything. And then occasionally there was perceived conflict between the 
mahinga kai and conservation values, but that only came to a head on this vehicle 
access issue [Respondent 6]. 
The vehicle access issue presented the biggest challenge of the plan development process, 
with DoC arguing that vehicle use over the ecological fragile greenpark sands area of Te 
Waihora was an affront to conservation values whereas the Waihora Management Board 
argued that their mahinga kai aspirations would be limited by restricting motor vehicles. 
Although this issue didn’t require the use of official mediation procedures, it was only 
resolved when DoC managers in Wellington demanded a compromise be reached. This led 
to vehicle access being allowed on the wetlands.  
The overriding Ngāi Tahu goals in the JMP are to rehabilitate the lake as an important site of 
mahinga kai and to provide the tribe with a sense of rangatiratanga. The Waihora 
Management Board plays a key role in implementing the plan with the support of the tribal 
corporate office.  The statutory scope of JMP and the role of the Board are limited to 
managing activities on the lake bed and lake shore. The Board has no decision making 
authority over issues of water allocation and water quality and intensification of catchment 
land use. At the insistence of the Board, the JMP articulates policies relating to water quality 
and land use in the catchment but the Board is limited to an advocacy role with the local 
authorities in order to give effect to thesex.  
5.  Reflections on Māori agency in contemporary Te Waihora governance  
The paper has so far been focussed on examining the historical legacy that has shaped the 
current Māori role in Te Waihora governance. We argue that this legacy has been shaped by 
three inter-related factors: property rights, globalisation and the regulatory environment for 
management. In this section we present insights from in-depth interviews with key Māori 
and non-Māori informants within Canterbury, answering to what degree Māori exercise 
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agency in Te Waihora governance today by extrapolating the significance of our three 
factors in enabling and constraining this agency.  
5.1 Property Rights 
According to a Ngāi Tahu respondent, discussions are ongoing between Māori and the 
Crown about indigenous water ownership rights. As a Māori respondent made it clear, the 
Ngāi Tahu leaders: 
Always raise [the issue of] ownership of water because that’s a national iwi concern. 
It’s not one a regional council can resolve, but it is a basic concern of iwi. So 
rangatiratanga would involve reference to that and that hasn’t gone away. As far as 
the iwi leadership is concerned, it is still on the table, as it is with other iwi 
throughout the country [Respondent 3]. 
While it is conceded that the Crown stands firm on its present position, the same 
respondent acknowledged that a greater management role which recognises the 
importance of the lake to them holistically could also enhance Māori agency in water 
governance. They state that:  
Rangatiratanga sometimes translates into legal ownership, but maybe the more 
significant thing is management. The perception I have is that Ngāi Tahu more than 
anyone else is driving the management of Te Waihora.  That’s a form of 
rangatiratanga. They may not own the lake water, but whatever it means to own the 
lake bed, there is statutory recognition there [Respondent 3]. 
In this respect, the Te Waihora Joint Management Plan is considered a step forward by all 
respondents.  The unique features of the lake, with its levels often rising over adjacent 
lands, meant that a plan which acknowledged the fluid boundaries of the lake is seen as 
important.  The JMP has given Māori agency over the lake as explained by a Māori 
informant: 
The rūnanga [around the lake] have rangatiratanga and can exercise rangatiratanga 
...The eel fishers [rental issue see section 5.3] have been the test. Now Ngāi Tahu in 
owning a lakebed can stand up and say this is the level of activity we will allow to 
take place on our land, and where we don’t want that activity, it will not occur. If we 
weren’t able to do that, then my answer to that question [if they have been granted 
rangatiratanga] is no [Respondent 12]. 
During  the treaty settlement negotiations,  the option to include the two local authorities  
with Ngāi Tahu and DoC in a joint-management plan that would mediate land and water use 
in the catchment  did not prove politically acceptable, as noted earlier. In hindsight, both 
Ngāi Tahu and DoC respondents see this option as being difficult to implement in practice, 
with a DoC respondent arguing that the two local authorities would have weakened the 
tenets of the agreement with their superior political power. They go onto to argue that 
exclusion of local authorities is in some ways strength of the plan: 
…in many respects this document as just a land owners’ plan has turned out to be a 
more powerful one than if we had done a whole catchment one. If we had done a 
whole catchment one including the councils then whatever Ngāi Tahu and ourselves 
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might have wanted would have been watered down from the regional influence…This 
document has come through quite strongly with what we want for the lake and has 
definitely given Ngāi Tahu and ourselves a stronger mandate for asking for things 
through the RMA process [Respondent 6]. 
The limited statutory lake bed management role has also enabled Ngāi Tahu, to an extent, 
to leverage agency over water management and land use in Waihora catchment in an 
advocacy role with local government.  In order to improve water quality in the lake, DoC and 
Ngāi Tahu have removed all grazing stock on their properties and have undertaken riparian 
planting programmes while the Te Waihora Environment Trust has funded these activities 
on private lake shore land. Advocacy by Māori and non-Māori to the local authorities within 
the catchment has also been successful at halting point source pollution from sewage 
outfalls from small nearby towns such as Lincoln into the lake. Although these preventive 
measures are critical for improving water quality in Waihora, the over-riding issue remains 
the intensification of farming in the catchment and the non-point source pollution which 
this causes. Virtually all respondents interviewed expressed strong reservations about land 
use intensification, arguing it was a major contributor to increasing pollution of the lake and 
its ability to sustain its major functions including food provision.  All the non-local authority 
respondents were critical of the failure of the two territorial local authorities to effectively 
regulate the impacts of intensification as a major contributor to lake eutrophication. 
5.2. Globalisation 
The driving force behind recent land intensification is in the Waihora catchment is economic 
globalisation. This has been fuelled by recent booms in dairy prices and the emergence of a 
powerful dairy co-operative in Fonterra, with many farms converting from the more 
traditional dry stocks such as sheep to dairying.  
The trend towards increasing intensification of land use is a major Ngāi Tahu concern: 
Non-point source pollution is an enormous concern. You’ve seen the trajectory of 
growth of land use in this catchment, well you just need to plot the irrigation 
allocation graph and see that it’s directly related to intensification. We haven’t seen 
that waste water yet through the ground water system, [but] we are getting 
increasing degradation in lowland streams and they feed into Te Waihora. We’re in 
for some worrying times; [while] people think it’s bad now, I would argue we have a 
lot worse to come potentially [Respondent 4].  
The trend toward land use intensification in the catchment is expected to continue for 
economic reasons. Central government views Canterbury’s water resources as giving it a 
global comparative cost advantage in the dairying industry and its national economic 
strategy is to increase the area under irrigation in the region by easing the regulatory path. 
This will be examined in more depth through the next section.  
5.3. Regulatory environment for management 
The regulatory environment for management is arguably more important than property 
rights or the effects of globalisation in shaping the current Māori role in water regulation. As 
outlined in section 2, this section will examine both external (exogenous) and internal 
(endogenous) regulations. Exogenous regulations relate to the mandates set by central 
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government legislation and/or regional council and local territorial authority planning. 
Endogenous regulations refer to the internal ethos, ethics and values which inform 
indigenous management and regulation of natural resources.  
5.3.1. Exogenous Regulations 
The Local Government Act 2002 and the RMA are both enabling local government statues 
with potential to enhance Māori role in water governance and land use planningxi. However, 
their potential in this respect has not been effectively harnessed in the Canterbury region. 
Thus, Canterbury Māori have never had a decision making role in local government. In 
common with other stakeholder groups, the iwi and runanga, rely on advocacy via planning 
submissions and appearances in statutory hearings in order to raise concerns about water 
issues. The barriers facing Māori in this respect are the same as those facing others. As 
explained by a local authority decision maker:  
When I look at the strength of submissions [under the RMA], it’s the ability of a group 
to have strong representation in regards to money, time and resources to actually 
put forth an effective submission [Respondent 9]. 
A few of our respondents, both Māori and non-Māori thought that the Te Waihora 
catchment would be a good opportunity to apply section 33 of the RMA, which as we have 
described earlier, permits local authorities to devolve responsibilities to mandated iwi 
organisations. Ngāi Tahu is currently engaged in discussions with the regional council 
concerning devolving authority for lake openings consents under section 33 to the local 
rūnanga. A local authority respondent, however, was of the view that the current political 
climate would not be receptive to such moves: 
At a political level, I don’t think you’re going to get that. I really don’t. The reason 
being a lot of people in the political field, I feel, do not have a great understanding of 
the Treaty of Waitangi or how co-management actually works. I guess at the end of 
the day there is, dare I say it, an element of mistrust in the ability of local tribes 
within their structure to actually manage an overarching resource [Respondent 9]. 
Likewise, a Māori respondent thought that that this would never happen in Canterbury 
because “this is politics, nobody wants to give up power” [Respondent 3].  
Even though the RMA empowers local authorities to regulate land and water resources, as 
noted earlier, the two Canterbury local authorities have been lax to do so.  Thus, there are 
few regulations within the Waihora catchment in regards to enforcing environmental 
standards on farmers: 
At the moment our district plan only regulates intensive poultry and pig farming, 
which comes under basically factory farming. It does not regulate, beef, sheep, cattle, 
deer [Respondent 9]. 
Under the RMA farmers have ‘existing use rights’, which allows their water use to continue 
unimpeded if the farm has not recently been converted from one stock to another. Farms 
which have recently converted, generally to dairying due to the higher profit margins, are 
required to fence the waterways on their properties. However, as a respondent argues: 
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It was contested by Federated Farmers, and the only streams and creeks that 
basically have to be fenced off are ones feeding the Selwyn River. No other small 
streams and creeks [Respondent 9]. 
Furthermore, economic pressures mean that farmers view fencing as taking away 
productive land from gainful use. As the same respondent goes onto state: 
[By] ripping up your hedgerows; you will get a couple of extra hectares to farm which 
from an economic perspective is fine, but environmentally, no. When you have that 
sort of mentality, [that] by fencing of the waterways you are taking the land away 
from production. So some farmers are saying “we want to be compensated” 
[Respondent 9]. 
Māori frustration with local authorities’ decision-making processes is evident in the 
following response to a decision this year by the Canterbury Regional Council to grant 
permission to a major irrigation project. This irrigation project is projected to bring 
economic benefits to the region despite negative environmental outcomes due to further 
land intensification that will occur. As recently reported (Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu, 2010),: 
Ngāi Tahu disagrees with the independent commissioners’ conclusion that the 
additional nitrate and phosphorous inputs into Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere via 
lowland streams "are unlikely to have such significant effect on phytoplankton 
(including algal blooms and flow on to the fishery) to the extent that the CPW scheme 
should not proceed" [as stated in the report of the planning consent commissioners]. 
Ngāi Tahu Te Waihora Management Board Chairwoman Terrianna Smith said it was 
distressing to hear of yet another decision to allow resource consents that would end 
up costing Te Waihora. "Clearly we are yet to learn from our past mistakes which 
have occurred time and time again so that our mahinga kai (customary food 
resources and practices) continue to be polluted and our relationship with Te 
Waihora is further degraded."  
The tribal authority has appealed the decision to the courts. 
5.3.2. Endogenous Regulations 
There are two inter-related facets to the endogenous regulatory framework for Te Waihora: 
the Te Waihora Management Board and Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu (TRONT).  
The Waihora Management Board comprises the six papatipu rūnanga from Ngāi Tahu who 
have a historical links to the lake. These six rūnanga elect representatives to the 
Management Board, which effectively represent Ngāi Tahu on issues relating to the lake. 
Within Ngāi Tahu, this is seen as an act of devolution, giving power to those who have the 
most direct relationship with the lake, the people who still use it daily for mahinga kai. As a 
Ngāi Tahu respondent explained to us: 
We [te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu] are the administrative agent in that way, but all the 
decision making and the strategic directions and the priorities are driven by the papatipu 
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rūnanga, I would tend to think they have more of an ownership in the lake and its 
resources than te rūnanga [Respondent 12]. 
TRONT is therefore a mediator on behalf of the Board but in a subsidiary relationship as a 
decision maker. Even within the Waihora Management Board, a number of the 
responsibilities for the lake are devolved to the closest rūnanga, Taumutu, located closest to 
the lake: 
Part of the tikanga is the practice of recognizing one as having kaitiaki 
responsibilities. Taumutu, you’re closest to this, you people are more involved with 
this lake more than we are, go and do what you can for us. There will be some rivalry 
and differences along the way but the basic principle is they are the leaders, they 
drive it, and they do it on behalf of the others [Respondent 3].   
The recent agreement reached over charging commercial eel fishers on the lake to pay for 
environmental protection measures illustrates the power of lake bed ownership to be able 
to set its own ‘endogenous’ regulation. The agreement also permits Ngāi Tahu to limit eel 
fishing in certain areas of the lake, allowing customary sources in this area to regenerate 
and remain untouched. It is argued by some Pakeha that these regulations are unfair on the 
existing commercial fishers, as expressed by Fisheries Lawyer Bruce Scott (Donaghue, 2010) 
below: 
When the Crown returns lakes, rivers or tributaries to iwi as part of the settlement 
process they are often not doing it in a manner which protects the rights of the 
existing commercial fishermen, including Māori fishermen. They are doing it in a way 
which creates a new injustice to resolve an earlier injustice. 
This is typical of commonly held views on endogenous regulation. From their perspective, 
granting control to the dispossessed indigenous minority creates a new perceived injustice 
for the settled majority, in this case, commercial fishers.  
Although these current gains are small, it is clear that endogenous regulation of Waihora 
enables Ngāi Tahu and the Te Waihora Management Board to exercise agency over the lake. 
The extent they are granted ownership is limited, but what ownership they do have enables 
them to leverage and implement their own management schemes informed by tikanga and 
the Māori worldview. These small gains will also help them leverage exogenous regulation, a 
situation which will be put to the test during resource consent hearings on new irrigation 
project (see section 5.3.1 above). 
6. Discussion  
We have argued in this paper that three factors enable and constrain the Māori role in 
water governance in Te Waihora: property rights, globalisation and the regulatory 
environment.  
In regards to the first factor, Ngāi Tahu have been enabled to acquire agency in the lake  
through the vesting of ownership of Waihora’s lake-bed as well as limited surrounding lands 
in the Treaty of Wataingi settlement. Although this property right has enabled Ngāi Tahu to 
exercise rangatiratanga in limited capacities (such as rent on commercial eel fishers and 
rehabilitating customary fisheries), it does not provide new capabilities for management of 
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the lake’s water. As we examined, under the RMA, the Crown views water as a publically 
owned resource which it takes sole responsibility for allocating and managing.  
Our paper then argued that the second factor, globalisation, is the primary driver of 
degradation in the lake’s water quality. The Canterbury agriculture economy is deeply 
embedded in the global economy. Intensification of land use in Te Waihora’s catchment and 
the rapid conversion to dairy farming in the region is driven by international market forces, 
supported by the policies of central Government, the territorial local authority and the 
regional council. The role of globalisation as a driver towards land intensification in 
Canterbury is expected to gather greater momentum in the near future. 
Finally, we argued that changes in national policies precipitated by the Ngāi Tahu Treaty 
settlement broke the monopoly of ‘white ruralities’ (Panelli et al, 2009) in Canterbury by 
granting limited recognition of Māori ownership and management rights in Te Waihora. 
However, the RMA regulatory regime for water planning in Canterbury has been, at the 
exogenous level, not only permissive of greater land intensification but also unwilling to 
devolve lake management powers to local Māori. Provisions within the RMA could allow for 
devolution of responsibility for lake management to Ngāi Tahu; however, both parties are 
sceptical as to whether this would be a politically expedient measure. Endogenous 
regulations allow Māori to exercise their own specific tikanga and value sets over the lake, 
best embodied in our case study through the roles and responsibilities of the Te Waihora 
Management Board. Although ownership responsibilities over water in the lake may be a 
long way off, the Waihora Management Board and its agent, TRONT, are using their 
endogenous values and limited ownership powers to leverage exogenous policies. 
The findings of this paper resonate with recent debates in the international literature on 
collaborative governance with indigenous peoples. Our findings lend support to both 
aspects of the debate highlighted earlier in the introduction to this paper. Thus, as has been 
demonstrated here, the hybrid governance landscape for Te Waihora has enabled local 
Māori to acquire a role relating to certain aspects of its management. Our study highlights 
the significance of property rights, globalisation and regulation in shaping Maori agency in 
Te Waihora. To this extent, the Te Waihora experience is in accord with international and 
New Zealand research findings (Berkes, 1986; Smith and Wishnie, 2000; Rangan and Lane, 
2001; Hunn et al., 2003; Petchey, 2007; Breton et al, 2007; Moller et al., 1997; 2000; 
Memon et al., 2003).  
However, despite the significant gains toward indigenous governance of Te Waihora over 
the last twenty years, effective Maori agency in the lake and wider catchment continues to 
be burdened by the historical forces of institutional inertia. Ngāi Tahu’s role as a decision 
making authority of the lake, legitimized by lake bed ownership and the Joint Management 
Plan, does not extend to a decision-making role over matters relating to the issues of water 
quality and catchment land use. As we have demonstrated, the forces of institutional inertia 
stem from property rights, globalisation and regulation. These three inter-related factors 
are powerful driving forces which continue to restrict Ngāi Tahu agency in the catchment to 
that of a stakeholder group. This conclusion lends support to international critics of 
collaborative governance cautious about the inclusive potential of collaborative governance 
institutions (Ellis, 2005; Peluso 2008; 2009). Comparable concerns about collaborative 
governance have been highlighted by New Zealand scholars (Matunga, 2000; Coombes 
 19 
 
2003; with Hill, 2005; 2007;). As Matunga (2000: 46) states “compensation or redress is now 
as much about returning resources to Māori as it is about reinstating their right to make 
planning decisions.”  
7. Conclusion 
A theme that comes across strongly in our study is that Māori understand their water 
governance role as partners in decision making, a partnership that extends beyond advocacy 
within collaborative planning processes. An example of this can be seen in the recent 
Canterbury Water Management Strategy developed by the Canterbury Mayoral Forum 
(2009).  Hence, Māori role in water governance in Canterbury will continue to be a highly 
contested topic. The significance of difference in perspective is possibly not fully grasped by 
policy makers and other stakeholder groups contemporarily. As the Māori Party co-leader 
Pita Sharples explained at the recent Indigenous People’s Legal Water Forum, the legislative 
framework for Māori participation is clear in the RMA, with section 6 requiring an 
acknowledgement of Māori relationships with the lands, section 7 illustrating a particular 
regard to katiakitanga and section 8 outlining that the RMA has to take into account the 
Treaty of Waitangi. However, he (Sharples, 2009) argues that: 
While these, and other sections of the RMA, provide a valuable starting point for the 
inclusion of Māori values and perspectives in resource management, the 
overwhelming sentiment among Māori is that they do not go far enough. Māori have 
been calling for a shift, from being ‘consulted’ to having a meaningful role in 
governance and decision making over water.  
What our paper has argued is that in the Te Waihora case study, this shift from being 
‘consulted’ to having ‘governance’ over water is still work in progress. Lack of effective 
governance authority means that whatever limited decision-making authority Māori are 
devolved, their values are still subjugated, reframing them as ‘subalterns’ in the post-
colonial society that is Aotearoa/New Zealand.  
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Appendix 1: Glossary of Māori terms 
Hapū - kinship group, clan, tribe, subtribe - section of a large kinship group. 
Iwi - extended kinship group, tribe, nation, people, nationality, race - often refers to a large 
group of people descended from a common ancestor 
Kaitiaki - trustee, minder, guard, custodian, guardian, keeper. 
Kāwanatanga -  government, dominion, rule, authority, governorship, province. 
Mahinga kai - garden, cultivation 
Māori - be native, indigenous, normal, usual, natural, common, fresh (of water), belonging 
to Aotearoa/New Zealand, freely, without restraint, without ceremony, clear, intelligible. 
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Rangatiratanga - sovereignty, chieftainship, right to exercise authority, chiefly autonomy, 
self-determination, self-management, ownership, leadership of a social group, domain of 
the rangatira, noble birth.   
Rūnanga - to discuss in an assembly. 
Taonga - property, goods, possessions, effects, treasure, something prized. 
Tangata whenua - local people, hosts, indigenous people of the land - people born of the 
whenua, i.e. of the placenta and of the land where the people's ancestors have lived and 
where their placenta are buried.   
Taniwha - water spirit, monster, chief, something or someone awesome - taniwha take 
many forms from logs to reptiles and whales and often live in lakes, rivers or the sea. They 
are often regarded as guardians by the people who live in their territory.   
Tikanga - correct procedure, custom, habit, lore, method, manner, rule, way, code, meaning, 
plan, practice, convention. 
Tino rangatiratanga - self-determination.   
                                                                
i The issue of restoration of Māori water governance rights enshrined in the Treaty is complicated by 
differences between the Māori and English translations of the Treaty. Arguably, the Māori version contains 
much stronger provisions relating to governance compared to the English translation. It is argued by Coombes 
(2003) that this divergence weakens the environmental governance provisions inherent in the document. The 
Māori version guaranteed tino rangatiratanga – or in other words, full chieftainship (akin to governance) – 
over natural resources and important habitats for food and harvesting. The English version only describes 
Māori as having limited government, translated into Māori as kāwanatanga.  
ii The issue as to whether Māori have customary title to freshwater is unresolved. According to a recent judicial 
decision, the introduction of common law to New Zealand from England did not extinguish Māori customary 
title. This means that whatever customary title Māori held to freshwater, prior to the assertion of British 
Sovereignty in 1840, will continue to exist unless it has been lawfully extinguished. Some nineteenth century 
deeds of sale of Māori land did explicitly transfer the rights to use water associated with the land but other did 
not. The issue of whether there are currently any Māori customary rights to water has not yet been considered 
by the Courts, so the legal position is unclear (Ruru, 2009, pp. 76-86; Mulcahy et al, forthcoming, p. 53). 
iii In 1981 the WCSA was amended to create Water Conservation Orders (WCO’s) which recognised for the first 
time the benefits provided by water in its natural state. WCO’s can set limits on the consumptive use of water 
by being placed on a number of outstanding water features, usually rivers, thus limiting the availability of 
water for extraction.  Much like the ‘prior appropriation’ framework above, WCO’s have been carried forward 
into the new water governance regime for New Zealand’s water, the Resource Management Act (RMA).  
iv The first of these is recognition of the relationship between Māori and their ancestral waters, as stated in 
Section 6 (e) of the Act. Secondly, Section 7 (a) states that kaitiakitanga have the possibility to exercise powers 
and functions of their roles under the RMA. Thirdly, Section 8 references the Treaty of Waitangi, stating that 
the spiritual and cultural significance of a local waterway can only be determined by specific tangata whenua 
who have traditional rights over that waterway.  
v Joseph and Bennion (2002, p.16) state that “a reason for this situation is because of the requirements of the 
legislation which set up preconditions and procedural requirements which are onerous.” The processes behind 
devolution of authority are far from clear, with many councils and iwi being unsure as to how to physically 
devolve certain tasks. There is no format available on how to answer a request (from the council’s perspective) 
or on how to physically lodge one in the first place (from the iwi perspective). 
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vi As Singleton (2007, 264) explains: 
“Technically, this wide, shallow, wind-blown water body is not a bona fide lake but a coastal lagoon 
that is intermittently opened to the sea. It is tenuously separated from the ocean by a 25-kilometre 
shingle bank called Kaitorete Spit which, at its lowest point, is four metres above sea level.” 
vii The Waitangi Tribunal is a commission of inquiry which was established under the Treaty of Waitangi Act 
1975 to investigate grievances bought forth by Maori relating to actions undertaken by the Crown which 
breach promises made in the Treaty of Waitangi. Although initially intended to refer temporally to events after 
1975, its legislation was altered to allow historical grievances to be heard as well.  
viii A significant flood in 1895 created the impetus to create more permanent structures at the Waihora outlet 
to better contain the lake (Singleton 2007). Attempts were made throughout the early 20th century to create 
permanent structures; however, they all suffered the same fate of being destroyed due to heavy seas. This led 
to the lake and its drainage being considered an ‘unruly child’ by the drainage administrators in the area.  
ix The New Zealand government introduced the State Owned Enterprises Act in 1986 which was designed to 
allow the transfer of Crown Land into a Land Corporation, with the intention of inducing sales onto third 
parties. Māori and the Waitangi Tribunal viewed the SOE Act as compromising the Treaty of Waitangi Act 
1975, which stated that only Crown Land could be used in settlements. If the Crown therefore was attempting 
to sell off some of this land, it would limit the possible future applications of Māori to settle claims over these 
territories (Prystupa, 1998: 136). Following these criticisms the Act was amended, only permitting the Crow to 
use the Act in such a way that was consistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. Following this, the 
Conservation Act in 1987 (s(4)) was amended. 
x This is also the case with water and land use policies contained in the Te Taumutu Runanga’s Natural 
Resource Management Plan (2003) and the Ngāi Tahu Freshwater Policy (1999).  
xi  The LGA 2002 states that a purpose of local government is to enhance Māori participation in local 
governance.  
 
